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TEXT: 
Since the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided the Quinlan case a quarter of a century 
ago, three American Supreme Court decisions n1 and a host of state appellate decisions 
have addressed end-of-life issues. n2 These decisions, as well as legislation addressing 
the same issues, have prompted a torrent of law journal articles analyzing every aspect of 
end-of-life law. In recent years, moreover, a number of law review articles, many 
published in this journal, have also specifically addressed legal issues raised by palliative 
care. n3 Much less is known in the United States, however, as to how other countries 
address these issues. Reflection on the experience and analysis of other nations may give 
Americans a better understanding of their own experience, as well as suggest 
improvements to their present way of dealing with the difficult problems in this area. 
 
This article offers a conceptual and comparative analysis of major legal issues relating to 
end-of-life treatment and to the treatment of pain in a number of countries. In particular, 
it focuses on the law of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Poland, France, the 
Netherlands, Germany, and Japan. 
 
The legal analysis of end-of-life and pain treatment is complex. It can involve issues of 
criminal law and the law of battery and negligence (tort/delict) as well as constitutional 
and international law. Legal analysis of these problems is shaped by the juridical system 
and philosophy of each country, as well as by international conventions that have been 
incorporated into the law of the respective countries. 
 
Poland, France, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United Kingdom (devolved 
administration in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) are unitary systems, whereas 
Canada, Germany, and Australia are federations, in which the legislatures of constituent 
provinces or states have the power to regulate the practice of medicine and the conduct of 
medical practitioners. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have common law 
systems in which the law is based on judge made precedents as well as legislation. The 
legal systems of Poland, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands are based 
primarily on national civil and criminal codes, though their appellate courts do make 
authoritative rulings on the law. This article will examine the common law countries 
together, as they share a common legal tradition and common precedents, while the civil 
law systems, which are more diverse, will be examined separately. 
 
To add to the complexity, national laws of members of the European Union, including the 
United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and France, are subject to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms n4 (ECHR) as interpreted by 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Poland, as an aspiring member of the 
European Union, is adapting its laws to fit in with the European Union's jurisprudence. 
n5 
 
Finally, the national laws of individual countries are shaped by the history, community 
values, economics, culture, religious orientation, and current predominant legal 
philosophy of those countries. In this article, we will high-light only the major issues, 
similarities, differences, and problems raised by these factors. 
  
CONSENT AND REFUSAL OF TREATMENT 
  
As a general rule, all common law and most civil law jurisdictions presume every adult 
person to have the mental capacity to consent to or to refuse any medical intervention, 
including life-saving or life-sustaining treatment, unless and until that presumption is 
rebutted. n6 It is irrelevant that the refusal may not be in the best interests of the patient, 
or that the decision may entail a risk of death. n7 The refusal must, *131 however, be 
unequivocal and often must be recorded in writing. The right to refuse medical treatment 
is based on the principle of personal autonomy, and was upheld by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Pretty v. the United Kingdom, n8 which noted that the right to refuse 
treatment conforms with the privacy guarantees contained in Article 8 of the ECHR. n9 
 
LEGAL APPROACHES TO END-OF-LIFE TREATMENT IN COMMON LAW 
COUNTRIES 
  
In general, the common law countries (the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia) have 
adopted very similar philosophical and juridical approaches toward end-of-life treatment. 
This is true with respect to palliative care, withholding and termination of life-sustaining 
treatment, assisted suicide, and active euthanasia. 
  
Palliative care 
  
The most controversial legal issue with respect to palliative care in the countries under 
consideration has been the use of opioids to alleviate patients' suffering in their final 
stages of life, particularly when the opioids are suspected of causing death. In the 1957 
English case of R. v. Adams, n10 Dr. John Bodkin Adams was charged with murder when 
it was discovered that he had treated a number of elderly patients who had died in his 
care with high doses of narcotic analgesics. In his address to the jury, Lord Justice Devlin 
said that a physician "is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and 
suffering, even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life." n11 
 
This approach is sometimes called the doctrine of double effect. Under this doctrine, the 
cause of death of patients who die while receiving pain treatment will be attributed to the 
underlying disease in situations where the patient's pain and other discomforts are 
controlled through properly calibrated titration of dosages, even if the dosages are high. 
n12 This is because the law sees a sharp distinction between appropriate palliative care, 
offered with an intention to ease a patient's pain and suffering, and actions specifically 
aimed at ending a patient's life. n13 This approach has been adopted by the House of 
Lords, n14 the Supreme Court of Canada, n15 and the Supreme Court of the United 
States. n16 
 
The High Court of Australia has yet to determine this issue. However, the South 
Australian Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act of 1995 n17 provides 
that medical practitioners will not incur civil or criminal liability for administering 
medical treatment with the intention of relieving the pain or distress of patients in the 
terminal phase of a terminal illness, even though an incidental effect of the treatment 
would be to hasten the death of the patient, providing they do so "with the consent of the 
patient or the patient's representative; and in good faith and without negligence; and in 
accordance with proper professional standards of palliative care." If these requirements 
are met, then "for the purposes of the law of the State, the administration of medical 
treatment for the relief of pain or distress ... does not constitute an intervening cause of 
death." n18 
 
Withdrawal and withholding of medical treatment from incompetent or 
unconscious patients where there is no advance directive 
  
In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, but not in Scotland, n19 the discontinuance of 
artificial nutrition and hydration for a patient in a vegetative state requires the prior 
sanction of a High Court n20 by way of a declaration based on the best interests test. n21 
The seminal common law case on the withdrawal of artificial life supports from 
incompetent persons is Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland. n22 Anthony Bland, at the age of 
17, sustained catastrophic and irreversible damage to the higher centers of his brain, 
which left him in a persistent vegetative state. The House of Lords decided that doctors 
might lawfully discontinue biochemical and other life support systems from a patient in a 
persistent vegetative state where the cessation of nourishment and hydration is an 
omission, and not an act. 
 
The House of Lords reasoned that nonconsensual treatment violates the principle of 
personal autonomy. Incompetent patients may, however, be treated nonvoluntarily on the 
basis of the doctrine of necessity where their best interests require that the treatment be 
administered "for the protection of the plaintiff's health and possibly his [sapient] life." 
n23 Once it becomes clear that the patient is permanently comatose or in a persistent 
vegetative state, however, his or her interests in being kept alive have ceased, taking with 
them the justification for the nonconsensual medical treatment, even though termination 
of life supports will also not further the person's best interests. In such circumstances, 
according to the House of Lords, there is no longer a duty to provide nourishment and 
hydration, and therefore failure to do so cannot constitute a criminal offense. Thus, Lord 
Goff of Chieveley observed: 
For my part, I cannot see that medical treatment is appropriate or requisite simply 
to prolong a patient's life when such treatment has no therapeutic purpose of any 
kind, as where it is futile because the patient is unconscious and there is no 
prospect of any improvement in his condition. n24 
In 2001, the High Court of England in National Health Service Trust A. v. M.; N.H.S. 
Trust B. v. H. n25 reexamined and affirmed the reasoning of the House of Lords in Bland 
in light of the ECHR. n26 
 
In Australia, doctors must apply the best interests standard when treating incompetent 
patients who have not executed a binding advance directive. The legal situation *132 
regarding withdrawal and withholding of life-saving or life-sustaining treatment is, 
however, unclear. In Marion's Case, n27 the High Court of Australia determined that 
where persons are disabled by age or mental incapacity from giving valid consent, an 
order or direction must be sought from the Family Court or Guardianship Board for 
authorization of nontherapeutic procedures. Since discontinuance of life-sustaining 
treatment is nontherapeutic, it might be prudent for doctors to seek similar directions. n28 
 
The South Australian Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act is an 
exception to this general rule insofar as it provides that, in cases where there is no valid 
prior direction to the contrary, a medical practitioner responsible for the treatment or care 
of a patient in the terminal phase of a terminal illness is "under no duty to use, or to 
continue to use, life sustaining measures in treating the patient if the effect of doing so 
would be merely to prolong life in a moribund state without any real prospect of recovery 
or in a persistent vegetative state." n29 In such cases, "the non-application or 
discontinuance of life sustaining measures ... does not constitute an intervening cause of 
death (i.e. novus actus interveniens: a cause that breaks a pre-existing chain of 
causation)." n30 
In Canada, a similar regime prevails. The Manitoba Court of Appeal has ruled that 
physicians have a unilateral right to make nontreatment decisions. n31 
 
Assisted suicide and active euthanasia 
  
The common law distinguishes between a physician's conduct in letting a patient die from 
an underlying disease and conduct that makes the patient die. It is the intention to bring 
about the death of another that forms the basis of the crimes of assisted suicide and 
murder. 
 
In Canada, the question of whether the right to refuse life-saving treatment should 
encompass the right to assisted suicide was determined in 1993 in Rodriguez v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General), n32 a case involving a 42-year-old woman who suffered 
from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Mrs. Rodriguez argued that the right to refuse medical 
treatment was a "liberty and security of the person" interest, protected by § 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights. She contended that she had a constitutional right to have a 
qualified physician set up technological means by which she might end her life when she 
was no longer able to enjoy life, by her own hand, and at the time of her choosing. She 
applied for an order that § 241(b) of the Criminal Code, n33 which prohibits the giving of 
assistance to commit suicide, be declared invalid on the ground that by precluding a 
terminally ill person from committing "physician-assisted" suicide, it violated her rights 
under § 7. 
 
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada determined that the Canadian Charter does 
not require lifting the statutory ban against assisted suicide because § 7 of the Charter 
protects three fundamental values: (1) the notion of personal autonomy relating to the 
right to make choices concerning one's own body; (2) freedom from state interference 
with respect to control over one's physical and psychological integrity and basic human 
dignity; and (3) the sanctity of life. The court noted: "even when death appears imminent, 
seeking to control the manner and timing of one's death constitutes a conscious choice of 
death over life." n34 Even though the prohibition of assisted suicide in § 241(b) of the 
Criminal Code impinged upon the first two values, these were trumped by the third value 
-- protecting and maintaining respect for human life. In 1995, the Canadian Senate 
Special Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide recommended that the prohibition 
against assisted suicide remain intact. n35 
 
A 2001 English case with very similar facts and outcome was determined by the House 
of Lords in R. (Pretty) v. the Director of Public Prosecutions. n36 Dianne Pretty had a 
motor neurone disease, a progressive neuro-degenerative disease of motor cells within the 
central nervous system. She was paralyzed from the neck downwards and confined to a 
wheelchair. n37 She requested the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) of the United 
Kingdom to agree in advance not to prosecute her husband were he to help her to commit 
suicide. Under § 2(1) of the Suicide Act of 1961 (U.K.), n38 it is a criminal offense with 
a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment for a person to aid, abet, counsel, or 
procure the suicide of another. 
 
The House of Lords determined, and the European Court of Human Rights affirmed 
(unanimously dismissing Mrs. Pretty's appeal), that there is no right to assisted suicide 
under common law or statute, and that no such right is guaranteed by the ECHR. The 
European Court of Human Rights declared that Article 2, which safeguards the right to 
life, cannot be interpreted as "conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right 
to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an 
individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life." n39 The court noted that 
although the conditions of terminally ill individuals vary, many patients will be 
vulnerable, and it is the vulnerability of the class that provides the rationale for the law 
against assisted suicide. n40 
 
There have been no appellate decisions regarding assisted suicide in Australia. As in all 
other common law jurisdictions, aiding and abetting suicide is a statutory offense 
punishable by imprisonment in all Australian states and the Australian Capital Territory. 
n41 
 
Active euthanasia or mercy killing is a crime in Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom. In Australia, in 1995, the Northern Territory's Parliament enacted the Rights of 
the Terminally Ill Act of 1995 (RTIA), n42 which decriminalized physician-assisted 
suicide and euthanasia by designating such conduct as legitimate "medical treatment." 
n43 In 1997, the Federal Parliament, pursuant to the plenary powers vested in it to make 
laws for the government of the Territories un-*133 der § 122 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, enacted the Euthanasia Laws Act of 1997 (Cth), which amended the 
Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act of 1978 nullifying the RTIA. n44 
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Latimer determined the issue of mercy 
killing motivated by the "necessity" of eliminating pain. n45 Robert Latimer, a 
Saskatchewan farmer, asphyxiated his 12-year-old daughter, Tracy, who had a severe 
form of cerebral palsy, by venting exhaust fumes from his pickup truck's tail pipe into the 
cab where he had placed Tracy. He was convicted of second-degree murder n46 and 
received the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility 
for 10 years. n47 The Supreme Court of Canada in an unanimous decision dismissed 
Latimer's appeals against conviction and sentence. n48 The court stated that "the harm 
inflicted in this case was ending a life; that harm was immeasurably more serious than the 
pain resulting from Tracy's operation, which Mr. Latimer sought to avoid," n49 
concluding that: 
 
Killing a person -- in order to relieve the suffering produced by a medically manageable 
physical or mental condition -- is not a proportionate response to the harm represented by 
the non-life-threatening suffering resulting from that condition. n50 
 
POLAND 
  
Medical practice in Poland is governed by the Medical Profession Act (2002), n51 the 
Health Service Institutions Act (1991), n52 the Law on Physicians' Associations (1989), 
n53 and the Code of Medical Ethics (1993), as well as the Polish Penal Code (1997) n54 
and the Constitution of the Polish Republic (1997). n55 
 
The Code of Medical Ethics includes provisions relating specifically to treatment of 
patients at the end of life. It is not a legal statute, however, and as such is not a source of 
law. Nevertheless, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its Opinion of October 7, 1992 
n56 determined that, although the norms set out in the Code of Medical Ethics have the 
character of deontological norms rather than legal rules, n57 they can be used to define 
more precisely the content of legal rules. Indeed, in medical courts, specific articles of the 
Code are invoked in proceedings against medical practitioners. n58 Medical practitioners, 
therefore, are under a legal obligation to adhere to the ethical norms of the Code of 
Medical Ethics. n59 This general rule, however, is subject to qualification in cases where 
there is conflict between the norms of the Code and substantive (statutory) law. 
According to the Constitutional Tribunal's Opinion of March 17, 1993, a medical 
practitioner cannot be penalized for practicing medicine in accordance with the law, even 
if such conduct is contrary to a principle of professional ethics. n60 Conversely, medical 
practitioners will be punished if they infringe the law, but not the Code of Medical 
Ethics, or if they act contrary to both the law and the Code. 
 
The conflict between legal rules and ethical norms is particularly acute in the case of 
withdrawal and withholding of life-saving treatment. There are no substantive law 
provisions in Poland that specify limits to the medical duty to institute or continue to 
provide life-sustaining treatment to incompetent terminally ill patients. Article 38 of 
Chapter 5, headed "Principles of Medical Practice," in the Medical Profession Act of 
2002 provides, however, that a "physician may decide to discontinue or not institute a 
treatment (unless prompt medical intervention is necessary)...." n61 
The qualifying clause "unless prompt medical intervention is necessary" refers to the 
"duty to rescue" provision contained in Article 30 of the Medical Profession Act. n62 
Article 30 imposes upon medical practitioners a duty to always save human life when a 
delay would result in death or serious physical or mental injury, or in other cases of 
emergency. n63 The positive duty to act to save human life is in line with "the duty to 
rescue" expressed in Article 162.1 of the Penal Code, which provides a punishment of up 
to three years imprisonment for failure to help a person who is in immediate danger of 
death or serious injury, where rendering such help is possible without the risk of death or 
serious injury to oneself. n64 
 
It is difficult to reconcile Article 162 of the Penal Code and Article 30 of the Medical 
Profession Act with Article 32 of the Code of Medical Ethics that vests in the medical 
practitioner the right to decide whether to discontinue resuscitation or "persistent 
treatment," having regard to the patient's medical chances of survival. Article 32 of the 
Code provides: 
(1) In terminal states the physician does not have the duty to undertake and 
continue resuscitation or persistent treatment, nor to resort to extraordinary 
measures, and 
(2) The decision to discontinue resuscitation rests with the physician and should 
be based on the assessment of the likely therapeutic success. 
 
Yet, unless the conflict between the substantive civil and criminal law and the Code of 
Medical Ethics can be resolved, substantive law -- that is, the duty to rescue -- will 
prevail over deontological and ethical principles. n65 
 
Under Article 150 of the Polish Penal Code (1997), n66 mercy killing is prohibited by 
law, but may or may not attract a custodial penalty. Article 31 of the Code of Medical 
Ethics prohibits the practice of active euthanasia. n67 According to the Constitutional 
Tribunal's Opinion of March 17, 1993, medical practitioners who practice euthanasia -- 
conduct that is contrary to the substantive law n68 and medical ethics -- will be held 
legally responsible for the patient's death, even if they personally regard such intervention 
to be justified. n69 
 
*134 FRANCE 
  
Since 1989 the French Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) n70 has given priority to 
European Union law over inconsistent national law, n71 and the Constitutional Council 
(Conseil constitutionnel) has obliged all French courts to apply the provisions of the 
ECHR where a French statute is incompatible with the ECHR. n72 
 
Following the May 1999 draft recommendation by the Council of Europe, encouraging 
member states to give incurable and dying patients the right to palliative care, n73 the 
French Parliament enacted the law of June 9, 1999 directed at guaranteeing access to 
palliative care for anyone "whose state of ill health requires it." n74 The law of June 9, 
1999 reinforces Article 38 of the 1995 Code of Medical Deontology, which, unlike the 
Polish Code of Medical Ethics, has statutory force, and is thus legally binding. n75 The 
Code of Medical Deontology mandates that: 
a dying person must be attended until the last, and given appropriate care and 
suitable support to preserve the quality of the life which is ending. A patient's 
dignity should be protected, and his or her entourage comforted. n76 
 
Though the emphasis is on alleviation of "sufferings" (les souffrances), and on the 
preservation of the dying person's quality of life, the law provides statutory 
encouragement for doctors to treat their patients with adequate doses of analgesic 
medication. The care provided must be "conscientious and accord with the scientific 
data." n77 
 
Article 37 of the Code of Medical Deontology cautions medical practitioners to "avoid 
any unreasonable obstinacy in pursuing investigations and treatments." In the context of 
the provision, the reference is presumably to avoid "aggressive" or "futile" treatment, 
which may or may not encompass withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment. 
n78 
 
Competent patients in France have a statutory right to refuse proposed treatment. n79 The 
law also grants relatives the right to be warned and informed, but gives them no power to 
make binding treatment decisions on behalf of an incompetent patient. n80 France has 
neither statutory rules nor medicoethical guidelines n81 governing the withholding and 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients. Indeed, the legal 
position relating to withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is complex. 
One of the problems stems from the definition of fault in French law. At common law, 
the question of whether an omission amounts to a legal fault depends on the scope of the 
duty. In cases of withholding or discontinuance of treatment, the question is whether the 
physician is under a duty to undertake or continue life-sustaining treatment for the 
particular patient. In France, for purposes of legal responsibility, the concept of fault by 
omission in the sense of abstention within an action (faute d'abstention dans l'action) n82 
is governed by a general principle rather than case-specific considerations: Once the 
treatment has been undertaken, withdrawal of treatment that leads to the deterioration of 
the patient's condition and consequent death will amount to a legal fault. Under the 
French doctrine of "unity of criminal and civil faults," physicians who withdraw or 
terminate treatment may be liable under civil as well as criminal law. 
 
Just as in Poland, the well-entrenched positive duty to rescue a person in danger 
embodied in Article 223-6(2) of the new 1992 Criminal Code (Article 63 of the old 
Criminal Code) makes a failure to rescue an offense (delit). n83 The medical duty to 
assist is expressed in a mandatory form in Article 9 of the Code of Medical Deontology. 
n84 
 
The crime of failure to rescue belongs in the category of "endangering behavior" offenses 
(mise en danger deliberee de la personne d'autrui); n85 the category also includes the 
offense of deliberately exposing a person to danger of death or injury (Article 223-1 of 
the new Criminal Code). Decisions to discontinue vasopressive drugs, undertake terminal 
weaning from ventilation, or withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation and mechanical 
ventilation from a patient would fall within these categories of offense. In 1996, an 
anesthesiologist who decided to extubate and withhold resuscitation from a patient who 
had no chance of recovery or survival was convicted of involuntary homicide by the 
Court of Appeal of Rouen on the grounds that the doctor's conduct was "against all logic, 
medical ethics and accepted rules of good practice." n86 The Court of Cassation (Cour de 
Cassation) dismissed the physician's appeal. n87 French jurists have interpreted the 
decision in the context of the debate about legalizing the practice of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide. n88 The Court of Cassation's reasoning is in harmony with the second 
clause of Article 38 of the Code of Medical Deontology, which mandates that a physician 
"has no right to deliberately bring about death." 
 
Inciting (provoquer) another to commit suicide is a crime under Article 223-13 of the 
Criminal Code, punishable by three years imprisonment. Providing drugs, lethal 
substances, or mechanical devices designed to enable a patient to commit suicide would 
come within the ambit of this offense. Encouragement and advertising of methods to 
commit suicide are offenses against the person under Article 223-14 of the Criminal 
Code. However, with the advent of the World Wide Web, this law may be difficult to 
police. n89 
 
With regard to active euthanasia, Article 221-1 of the Criminal Code states: "voluntarily 
killing another constitutes murder," and is punishable by 30 years imprisonment. The 
offense of homicide has to be a positive intentional act rather than an abstention that 
causes death. n90 Killing another person on request would fulfill the requirement. The 
French Criminal Code includes a specific offense of poisoning, defined as "attacking the 
life of another through the use or administration of substances that cause death," which is 
also punishable by 30 years imprisonment. n91 In the prosecution of employees from the 
French National Blood Transfusion *135 Centre (Centre National de Transfusion 
Sanguine) for knowingly placing on the market unheated blood products infected with 
HIV, the Court of Cassation did not exclude the possibility that the offense of poisoning 
could be made out without the specific intention to kill. n92 
 
In 1999, a criminal penalty was imposed on a hospital physician for "accompanying into 
death" a 92-year-old comatose and hemiplegic woman who developed gangrene. The 
physician injected the patient with 5 grams of potassium chloride. n93 The National 
Council of the Order of Physicians suspended the defendant for one year from medical 
practice for violation of the second clause of Article 38 of the Code of Medical 
Deontology. n94 
 
GERMANY 
  
Article 2, P2 of the German Constitution recognizes that "everyone has a right to life and 
to bodily integrity." In the context of other medicolegal controversies, such as those 
involving abortion or research involving human embryos, Germany has taken a strong 
"pro-life" position. Indeed, Germany's historical burden from the Nazi period is often 
invoked as imposing upon Germany the obligation to provide leadership to the world in 
fighting to recognize and preserve the sanctity of life. n95 
 
The German Constitution also, however, recognizes rights to "free development of 
personality," n96 "inviolable freedom," n97 and "inviolable dignity." n98 In fact, as the 
law of decision-making at the end of life has developed in Germany, the right to free and 
autonomous decision-making has uniformly trumped the right to life. German law 
governing end-of-life decisions is at this point driven primarily, indeed almost solely, by 
the principle of autonomous decision-making. 
 
Since at least the 1950s, the German courts have recognized the right of patients to refuse 
medical treatment. n99 It is beyond dispute that a competent dying patient in Germany 
can refuse treatment intended to extend his or her life. If an informed patient refuses life-
sustaining treatment, the treatment must be terminated. This is referred to in Germany as 
"passive Sterbehilfe," and is generally accepted. 
 
The right to self-determination for the competent patient extends beyond this, however. 
Suicide is not illegal in Germany. n100 While the law does prohibit active euthanasia, 
n101 in a 2001 case, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) held that the 
psychologist-leader of an assisted suicide group who aided an elderly woman suffering 
from multiple sclerosis and other infirmities to commit suicide by supplying a deadly 
drug was not guilty of causing her death. n102 The court accepted that the patient was 
responsible for her own death, and that the defendant, who assisted her by supplying the 
means of death, was not responsible. However, the court did affirm the defendant's 
conviction for violating the controlled substances laws in supplying the drug, rejecting 
the defendant's defense of necessity. 
 
A doctor's assistance in a patient's suicide can collide with the well-recognized duty of 
rescue imposed upon doctors by German law. In the 1984 Wittig case, the German 
Supreme Court held that a doctor who does not try to forestall the consequences of an 
attempted suicide may be criminally liable. n103 In the 1988 Hackethal case, however, 
the Supreme Court suggested that the doctor may be freed from the obligation to rescue if 
the patient experienced his life as torture and wanted to escape it; n104 and in the 2001 
case noted above, the court held that the duty of rescue did not apply since the patient, 
upon taking the drug, became rapidly unconscious and beyond help. 
 
The right of self-determination recognized in these cases does not end when the patient 
becomes incompetent. In its judgment of September 13, 1994, the German Supreme 
Court explicitly recognized the right of an incompetent patient's representative to refuse 
treatment. In that case, the son and the physician of a 70-year-old patient with irreversible 
brain damage had requested the nursing staff of an institution to discontinue nutrition and 
hydration. n105 The nursing staff refused and notified the guardian court, which in turn 
informed the prosecutor, resulting in the physician's and the son's prosecution for 
attempted manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed a guilty verdict, recognizing that 
the patient's right to self-determination encompasses a right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment, and that this right could be exercised on behalf of incompetents where 
sufficient evidence exists, based on the patient's written or oral statements, religious 
views, and values, that the person would have declined treatment. 
 
German law presently provides several avenues for decision-making for incompetents. 
n106 The first possibility is the living will (Patientverfugungen). n107 Patients may, 
while competent, expressly spell out what they want done in the event of future 
incapacity. Living wills do not seem to have the force that they have in the United States, 
but are rather a datum to consider in making end-of-life determinations. In practice, 
however, if a recent living will is available that addresses the situation at hand, it will 
probably be followed. Second, patients may grant another person a power of attorney to 
make medical decisions (Vorsorgevollmachten) in the future event of incapacity; this 
must be done expressly in writing while competent. n108 Third, a patient may nominate a 
guardian (Betreuer) for the guardianship court to appoint in the event of incapacity. 
Under the guardianship law, the guardianship court must approve any medical decisions 
made by a guardian or power of attorney that threaten death or will have long-lasting 
effects on health. n109 In its widely reported decision of July 20, 1998, the State 
Supreme Court of Frankfurt am Main held that the daughter and guardian of an 85-year-
old woman in a persistent vegetative (but not terminal) condition could have artificial 
nutrition and hydration withdrawn (in accordance with the earlier expressed wishes of the 
mother), but that the approval of the guardianship court needed to be obtained. It is 
arguable, however, that *136 guardian court approval is not necessary if the patient is in 
the process of dying. n110 
 
Where no living will, person holding a power of attorney, or guardian exists, the 
attending physician must attempt to determine what the incompetent patient would have 
wanted done in the situation (mutma [beta] lichen Willen). This should be discerned 
considering the patient's earlier statements, religious convictions, and attitude toward 
pain, as well as from the seriousness of the patient's current condition. n111 If it is 
impossible to sort out the patient's presumed will, the doctor should decide in the patient's 
best interests. 
 
Though German law places a heavy emphasis on the patient's right of self-determination, 
it also emphasizes the obligations of physicians to dying patients. In particular, the doctor 
has an obligation to protect the patient from pain. In several cases, health care 
professionals have been found liable in civil and criminal law for causing unnecessary 
pain to patients by failing to provide adequate pain therapy. n112 Moreover, the doctor 
who does attempt to protect a patient from pain can expect the protection of the law. In a 
1996 case, the German Supreme Court held that a doctor who provided a dying patient 
with medically indicated pain medication in accordance with the expressed or presumed 
wishes of the patient, perhaps hastening the patient's death as a result, did not break the 
law. n113 This process is referred to in the German literature as Indirekt Sterbehilfe. 
Nevertheless, some critics have charged that German doctors are reluctant to provide 
adequate pain therapy. A recent article by Klaus Kutzer, a justice of the German Supreme 
Court, quotes Professor Dr. Zens as stating that prescribing opiates in Germany for pain 
treatment lags 10 years behind other European countries. n114 Dr. Kutzer suggested that 
this might in part be due to restrictive interpretations of the German controlled substances 
regulations. Despite a commitment to palliative care as an alternative to euthanasia, 
palliative care still seems underdeveloped in Germany. n115 
 
JAPAN 
 
The law respecting end-of-life decisions seems somewhat less developed in Japan than in 
the other countries in our study. n116 No statutory scheme has emerged for dealing with 
end-of-life decisions, and only a handful of judicial precedents give guidance. There is 
also little legal authority on pain management. 
 
Patient autonomy is not as firmly established in Japan as in other countries. The principle 
of patient decision-making is certainly recognized. Indeed, a recent Japanese Supreme 
Court decision unanimously concluded that doctors who transfused a Jehovah's Witness 
against her express instructions had infringed her personal rights, and awarded damages 
for emotional distress. n117 Nevertheless, Japanese doctors are reluctant to disclose 
much information to their patients, and generally expect patients to follow their 
directions. n118 In particular, doctors are reluctant to disclose (and patients perhaps 
reluctant to receive) terminal diagnoses (especially a diagnosis of cancer), apparently 
believing that the patient will give up trying to survive in the face of such a diagnosis. 
Japanese doctors are more likely to disclose the diagnosis to the family, and work with 
the family to deceive the patient. n119 
 
Article 202 of the Japanese Criminal Code prohibits assistance in suicide or killing 
another on request. Physicians rely on this statute in refusing requests to terminate end-
of-life treatment. On the other hand, once doctors decide that further treatment is not 
indicated, they can rely on Article 35 of the Criminal Code, which offers a defense of 
justification for acts done "in the course of legitimate business." n120 
 
Two reported court decisions involving euthanasia are the primary sources of end-of-life 
decision-making law in Japan. The first was the 1962 Nagoya High Court decision, n121 
in which a son was charged with "ascendant homicide" (the aggravated crime of killing 
one's ancestor) for poisoning his terminally ill father, who was suffering great pain, 
allegedly at the father's request. 
 
The court countenanced the possibility that euthanasia could be legally permissible, but 
identified six conditions that had to be present: (1) the patient must be suffering from an 
incurable and imminently terminal condition; (2) the patient must be suffering unbearable 
and unrelievable pain; (3) the patient must be killed with the intention of alleviating the 
pain; (4) the act should be done only at the patient's explicit request; (5) the euthanasia 
should normally be carried out by a physician; and (6) the euthanasia must be carried out 
through ethically acceptable means. 
 
The court held that the final two conditions had not been met in the particular case, and 
thus convicted the son, though he was sentenced to only four years in prison, with three 
suspended, for what was a potentially capital crime. In four subsequent cases of 
euthanasia by relatives, various courts found one or more criteria to be lacking and thus 
found the defendants guilty, but in each case the defendant was given a relatively light 
sentence. n122 
 
The other reported case involving euthanasia, a 1995 case from the Yokohama District 
Court, involved the criminal prosecution of a doctor who had, in response to a patient's 
family's insistent and incessant requests, first terminated nutrition and hydration, then 
injected the patient with high doses of analgesics, and finally injected the patient with 
verapamil hydrochloride and potassium chloride, causing the patient's death. n123 The 
court convicted the doctor of murder, but sentenced him to only two years in prison. 
The court held that treatment of patients can be terminated if death is unavoidable and the 
patient is in the final stages of an incurable disease. The court suggested that more than 
one doctor should make the judgment of the impossibility of recovery and the patient 
should make an informed *137 expression of his or her wish that treatment cease. If the 
patient is unable to consent, the family should be given accurate information about the 
patient's condition and then be allowed to state the patient's "inferred intent," based on its 
knowledge of the patient's character and values. The court expressed its hope that patients 
would have living wills in the future, but also stated that if a living will was vague or 
remote in time it might not be of much use. The court concluded that life support 
measures (including artificial nutrition and hydration) could be terminated as well as 
other treatment measures, but the decision regarding the timing and termination of 
treatment was a medical judgment, presumably primarily for doctors to make. 
 
With respect to euthanasia, the court distinguished between passive euthanasia (the 
cessation of life-sustaining treatment), indirect euthanasia (terminal sedation), and active 
euthanasia. The court stated that euthanasia is only appropriate if: (1) the physical pain is 
difficult to bear (mental suffering does not suffice); (2) the time of unavoidable death is 
near; (3) methods of eliminating the pain are exhausted; and (4) there is a clear 
expression of intent to accept death. Active euthanasia is permissible only if death is 
imminent, but indirect euthanasia can be used to hasten death. Active euthanasia is also 
only permissible if there is a clear expression of the patient's intent -- substituted 
judgment does not suffice. Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, can be based on 
medical judgment as to futility and on the family's statement of intent, based on the 
patient's inferred intent, as noted above. 
 
In the particular case (where the doctor had injected the patient with verapamil 
hydrochloride and potassium chloride at the family's request), the court held that active 
euthanasia was inappropriate because there was no informed consent on the part of the 
patient (who had not been told he was dying of cancer), the patient was unconscious and 
therefore not experiencing pain, and the family had not been told that the patient was not 
in pain. The court also faulted the doctor for relying on the family's judgment, as he had 
only known them a short time, and for buckling under the son's insistence on euthanasia, 
given the doctor's "higher status and position." 
 
The law that emerges from these cases contrasts with the law of the United States and 
other common law countries in that it is more open to active euthanasia, but more reticent 
to accept withdrawal of treatment (which is effectively treated as a form of euthanasia). 
The two court decisions, for example, did not seem to countenance withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment for a nonterminal patient in a persistent vegetative state. Advance 
directives have no particular legal status in Japan, though several organizations offer 
advance directive forms and encourage their use. n124 
 
Japan has a very strict narcotic law, and medical use of narcotics is much more limited 
than in other countries. n125 One expert states: "Such a rigid and complicated system of 
justifying the use of narcotics has forced many cancer patients with treatable pain to 
suffer compared with other advanced countries." n126 Physicians seem to fear that use of 
narcotics to control pain might lead to addiction or shorten the patient's life. 
 
THE NETHERLANDS 
 
The Netherlands was until recently the only nation in the world to have legalized active 
euthanasia (it was joined in 2002 by Belgium). In fact, the Dutch Criminal Code, like the 
German and Japanese codes, prohibits taking the life of another person "at the other 
person's express and earnest request," and also prohibits murder, manslaughter, and 
assisted suicide. n127 Since the mid-1900s, however, Dutch prosecutors have refrained 
from prosecuting doctors who committed euthanasia when the doctors conformed with 
certain substantive and procedural requirements established by the Supreme Court. n128 
The court based these requirements on its interpretation of Article 40 of the Criminal 
Code, which provides: "A person who commits an offense as a result of a force that he 
could not be expected to resist [overmacht] is not criminally liable." n129 In the 1984 
Schoonheim case, a general practitioner was prosecuted for killing a 93-year-old woman 
who was near the end of her life and suffering terribly, and had urgently requested 
euthanasia. The court accepted the argument that the killing was justified because the 
doctor had resolved in a responsible way the conflict between the professional duty to 
preserve life and the duty to spare a patient from suffering, and thus met the defense of 
necessity recognized by Article 40. n130 
 
In April of 2001, the Dutch Parliament, after two decades of debate, adopted the 
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, which 
also amended the Criminal Code and the Burial and Cremation Act. This statute, which 
came into effect in 2002, legalizes the practice of euthanasia and of assistance in suicide 
by physicians where specific substantive and procedural requirements are met. n131 The 
Act amends Articles 293 and 294 of the Criminal Code, which prohibit killing on request 
and assistance in suicide, to provide that those acts are not illegal "if committed by a 
physician who fulfills the due care criteria" of the Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide Act, "and if the physician notifies the municipal pathologist" in 
accordance with § 7(2) of the Burial and Cremation Act. n132 
 
The "due care" criteria of § 2 of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide 
Act require that: 
a. the physician holds the conviction that the request by the patient was voluntary 
and well-considered; 
b. the physician holds the conviction that the patient's suffering was lasting and 
unbearable; 
*138 c. the physician has informed the patient about the situation he was in and 
about his prospects; 
d. and the patient holds the conviction that there was no other reasonable solution 
for the situation he was in; 
e. has consulted at least one other, independent physician who has seen the patient 
and has given his written opinion on the requirements of due care, referred to in 
parts a-d; and 
f. has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due care. 
 
The Act further requires that a doctor who performs active euthanasia or assists with 
suicide under the statute must notify the local coroner of the death, providing the coroner 
with a detailed report on compliance with the due care requirements. n133 The coroner 
must in turn notify a regional review committee established under the Act for reviewing 
euthanasia cases. n134 The coroner may also notify the prosecutor, who may in turn 
inform the coroner and regional review committee if he objects to the burial or cremation 
of the patient. n135 The regional review committee (which must include at least one 
legally trained member (the chair), one physician, and one ethicist) reviews the report, 
and decides whether the doctor has complied with the due care criteria. n136 The 
committee may inform the prosecutor or the regional health care inspector if it concludes 
that the statutory procedure has not been complied with. n137 
 
Doctors have long been expected to report cases of active euthanasia or assisted suicide 
to the local coroner. n138 Reporting has lagged well behind practice, in part because of 
the reluctance of doctors to report their conduct to local prosecutors. n139 Under the new 
procedure, the government hopes that reporting will become more accepted, as the 
committees will have the power to shield reporting physicians from the threat of 
prosecution. n140 
 
The recent legislation also clears up two matters that had not been resolved in earlier 
court decisions. The first of these is how the euthanasia law operates with respect to 
children. Under the statute, a physician may terminate the life of a child aged 16 to 18, or 
assist with his or her suicide at the child's request, after consulting the child's parents. 
n141 If the child is between 12 and 16, the attending physician may only honor a request 
for euthanasia or assistance in suicide if the child's parent or guardian agrees. n142 The 
second issue is that of persons who are incompetent, but who had prior to becoming 
incompetent executed an advance directive requesting that their lives be terminated upon 
reaching some future state of deterioration. n143 The physician may honor this request if 
otherwise in compliance with the due care criteria. 
 
The statute does not require that the patient be in a terminal condition. It does not even 
require that the suffering be physical. In the Chabot case in 1994, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the patient's "unbearable and hopeless suffering" could be mental rather 
than physical, though it upheld the conviction of the psychiatrist in the particular case for 
violating other requirements in euthanizing an inconsolably grieving woman at her 
request. n144 Every year a handful of psychiatric patients (2-5) are euthanized or assisted 
in suicide. 
 
The statute does not address several important issues, some of which are otherwise 
resolved by court decisions, others of which remain unresolved. First, it does not address 
the practices of withdrawal of medical treatment or of terminal sedation. These practices 
are generally accepted in the Netherlands, and are specifically not considered to be 
euthanasia. n145 Dutch law, of course, permits competent patients to request that life-
sustaining treatments (including artificial nutrition and hydration) be withdrawn or 
withheld. n146 Written advance directives, executed by a patient while competent and 
refusing treatment under specified circumstances, are also recognized under Article 
450(3) of the Medical Contracts Act, though the statute also permits doctors to override 
the refusal if there are "well founded reasons for doing so." n147 Physicians may also 
withdraw or withhold treatment that they regard as "futile." n148 And doctors are 
permitted to administer drugs as necessary to relieve pain, even though the pain 
medication may hasten death. n149 These practices are regarded as "normal" medical 
practice, and deaths resulting from them are regarded as natural deaths. They account for 
far more deaths than euthanasia or assisted suicide, 38.5 percent versus 2.7 percent, 
according to a 1995 study. n150 
 
Finally, the statute does not address the situation of patients in a persistent vegetative 
state (except if they have already executed an advance directive). A recent case found a 
general practitioner guilty of murder for killing an 84-year-old dying patient who was in a 
coma, but the court imposed only a suspended fine as a sanction. n151 Because the 
patient was incapable of voluntarily requesting euthanasia, the case was not covered by 
the statute. Surveys, however, show that killing patients in the absence of a voluntary 
request is not uncommon (perhaps about 1,000 cases a year), and might in some cases be 
found to be justified under the defense of necessity where sustaining life could be 
regarded as inhumane. n152 
 
The practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands has been widely condemned by external 
commentators, and is not universally accepted within the Netherlands. n153 The new 
Conservative government elected this past summer has pledged to review the practice of 
euthanasia. A significant majority of the Dutch population, however, seems to have 
accepted the current practice of euthanasia. Dutch commentators also often claim that 
other countries permit very similar medical practices, but simply do not admit to doing 
so. Without joining this debate, we must observe that the Netherlands firmly holds down 
the most extreme position in its end-of-life law of any country in our survey. 
 
*139 CONCLUSION 
  
Each of the countries surveyed here addresses end of life and pain management from its 
own unique legal perspective. There seems to be consensus on a few issues (the right of 
competent persons to refuse treatment), near-consensus on more issues (the 
impermissibility of active euthanasia), yet more diversity on others (the withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment). Most countries recognize the use of large doses of narcotics at 
the end of life to ease pain, yet in a number of countries experts believe that pain remains 
undertreated. While the common law countries on the whole take similar approaches, the 
civil law countries are more varied in their responses. Learning from the perspectives of 
other countries might help us to understand our own law better, and perhaps to improve 
it. 
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